Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing by Fu, H et al.
Title Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically AllocatingHeterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing
Author(s) Fu, H; Li, Z; Wu, C; Chu, X
Citation
The IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing
(CLOUD), Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 27 June -2 July 2014. In the
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud
Computing (CLOUD), 2014, p. 152-159
Issued Date 2014
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/201100
Rights IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD).Copyright © I E E E Computer Society.
Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating
Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing
Haoming Fu, Zongpeng Li
Department of Computer Science
University of Calgary
{hafu, zongpeng}@ucalgary.ca
Chuan Wu
Department of Computer Science
The University of Hong Kong
cwu@cs.hku.hk
Xiaowen Chu
Department of Computer Science
Hong Kong Baptist University
chxw@comp.hkbu.edu.hk
Abstract— In a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions
heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource
pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are
efﬁcient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most.
Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs,
and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning.
Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller
revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known
as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting
VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select
bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with
guaranteed economic efﬁciency under truthful bidding. These
auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that
instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and
price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve
seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be
tailored to maximize truthfulness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is emerging as a new computing paradigm
for ﬂexibly organizing a shared pool of conﬁgurable resources
(CPU, RAM, storage, etc.) in data centers into various types
of virtual machines (VMs), for allocation to cloud users any-
where, anytime [1]. Leveraging resource virtualization, such
a paradigm abstracts the underlying physical resources from
the users by directly providing them with the view of VMs.
As a market-driven pricing approach that provides economic
incentives for both the cloud provider (CP) and cloud users
(CUs), auctions represent a fast and efﬁcient mechanism for
VM allocation. For a well known example, Amazon has made
its initial effort to implement an auction-based VM allocation
mechanism termed Spot Instances [2].
Existing literature on VM auctions often treats VMs as
identical or substitutable goods [3], [4]. However, CUs have
natural demands for combinations of heterogenous VMs in
practice, given the inherent heterogeneity in real-world com-
puting tasks. For instance, a social gaming application often
consists of a front-end web server layer, a load balancing layer
and a back-end data storage layer, each best served by a VM
that is intended for communication-intensive, computation-
intensive, and storage-intensive tasks, respectively [5]. Table
I shows an excerpt from the Amazon EC2 Spot Instances.
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Multi-unit combinatorial auctions are natural for such a cloud
market, enabling expressive bids for requesting bundles of VM
instances belonging to different types.
TABLE I
VM CONFIGURATIONS FROM SPOT INSTANCES [2].
ID VM Type CPU ECU∗ Memory Storage
1 m1.medium 1 2 3.75 GB 410 GB
2 m1.large 2 4 7.5 GB 840 GB
3 c1.xlarge 8 20 7 GB 1680 GB
4 cc2.8xlarge 32 88 60.5 GB 3360 GB
5 m2.xlarge 2 6.5 17.1 GB 420 GB
6 m2.2xlarge 4 13 34.2 GB 850 GB
7 hi1.4xlarge 16 35 60.5 GB 2048 GB
∗ECU: EC2 compute units
Prior to the phase of allocating VMs to CUs, the CP needs
to assemble the conﬁgurable resources from its resource pool
into VM instances [1]. The de facto standard in the literature
of VM auctions is to ignore the phase of resource provisioning,
assuming implicitly the strategy of static resource provision-
ing (SRP) [6] — i.e., VMs are pre-conﬁgured and already
assembled when CUs’ bids are received. In contrast, dynamic
resource provisioning (DRP) is considered in this work. DRP
enables the ﬂexibility of tailoring the VM construction process
to the speciﬁc bids received, improving hardware utilization
and overall revenue gleaned. DRP is practically feasible in that
online VMs deployment incurs only a small time overhead [7].
The celebrated VCG mechanism [8]–[10] represents essen-
tially the only auction mechanism that is both truthful and
efﬁcient [11]. In the context of the cloud market, an auction
is truthful if a CU has no incentives to lie about its valuation
of its desired VM bundle; and (economic) efﬁciency holds
when winners are chosen to maximize the aggregated valuation
of awarded VM bundles. Despite a myriad of interests in
theoretical research, the VCG mechanism suffers from two
severe economic problems that have essentially prevented its
direct application in practice. First, a VCG auction generates a
low revenue for the auctioneer, under-exploiting the payment
potential of CUs. Second, a VCG auction is susceptible to
shill bidding, or false-name bidding, in which a single CU
impersonates multiple CUs, each bidding for a subset of the
desired VM instances [12].
Since the VCG mechanism represents the only truthful and
efﬁcient auction mechanism, a relaxation of either efﬁciency
or truthfulness is inevitable in any auction design that aims
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to address its two inherent problems. Previous research often
concentrates on truthfulness by relaxing efﬁciency, because
social welfare maximization leads to NP-hard problems often
in the form of 0-1 integer programs [6]. However, latest
empirical evidences suggest that 0-1 linear integer programs
resulting from such real-world problems can be solved in a
reasonable amount of time (e.g., 5000 integer variables in
less than 1 second using CPLEX [13] on a laptop computer).
A sacriﬁce of efﬁciency is therefore less justiﬁed. Core-
selecting auctions, recently proposed in economics [14]–[16],
provide a promising direction for designing combinatorial
auctions that are efﬁcient, shill-proof, and generate satisfactory
revenues. An auction outcome is in-core if no other outcome
both is preferred by some subset of CUs and increases the
CP’s revenue at the same time. The in-core property implies
efﬁciency (social welfare maximization), which in turn ensures
effective utilization of cloud resources.
This work makes the following three main contributions.
First, we are the ﬁrst to apply the core-selecting auction
framework to a cloud market, by formulating a winner de-
termination problem, and a pair of correlated linear program
(LP) and quadratic program (QP) for payment computation.
While guaranteeing efﬁciency, the in-core property is further
proven to be sufﬁcient and necessary to avoid shill bidding.
Furthermore, our core-selecting auctions are able to achieve a
revenue that is at least on par with that of VCG mechanisms,
and can be tailored to achieve provable minimization of
CUs’ incentive to deviate from truthful bidding. Our proposed
auctions further represent the ﬁrst design of multi-unit core-
selecting combinatorial auctions.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the three-dimension core-selecting auction design.
Second, we propose a new, three-dimension auction frame-
work (Fig. 1) for modeling dynamic resource provisioning.
Existing cloud auctions are mostly two dimensional, including
winner determination (VM bundle allocation) and payment
computation, with static resource provisioning. Our empirical
studies reveal that dynamic provisioning can enable substantial
improvements over static provisioning in terms of social
welfare, seller revenue, and resource utilization.
Third, departing from the previous standard of simplifying
VMs into homogeneous and substitutable commodities, our
core-selecting auctions give up the restrictive assumption that
all VMs are equally powerful, or equally powerful up to an
integer scaling factor [6]. Our auctions are expressive enough
to model (a) the provisioning of heterogeneous types of VMs
for sale at the CP side, and (b) the desire of VMs and VM
bundles of different nature by real-world computing jobs, and
hence are more readily applicable in realistic cloud systems.
We conducted extensive simulations to examine the per-
formance of the proposed core-selecting VM auctions, driven
partially by real world traces from Google Cluster Data [17].
Our auctions run efﬁciently on a platform with limited com-
puting resources, and generate higher revenues than the VCG
mechanism does. DRP is observed to enable a stably high
resource utilization and outperforms SRP in terms of revenue
by a ratio of at least 20%, because judiciously provisioning
resources can accommodate more requests from CUs.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss related work in Sec. II,
and present preliminaries in Sec. III. Sec. IV introduces and
analyzes core-selecting auctions for a cloud market, while Sec.
V studies payment rules. Simulation studies are presented in
Sec. VI. Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The classic VCG mechanism [8]–[10] is both efﬁcient and
truthful, but suffers from low seller revenue and vulnerability
to shill bidding [12]. Many existing auctions for VM allocation
similarly choose to enforce absolute truthfulness and have to
settle for a low revenue. Zhang et al. [3] proposed an online
auction for truthful VM allocation to serve heterogeneous
user demands, yet it achieves only 50% of the VCG revenue.
Auctions belonging to this realm also appeared in markets
formed by federations of clouds, for which two truthful
double-auctions were speciﬁcally designed [18], [19]. Zhang
et al. [20] designed a randomized combinatorial auction by
utilizing a pair of primal and dual linear programs, and
pursue absolute truthfulness at the price of computational and
economic efﬁciencies.
Using auction mechanisms to manage VM allocation has
been extensively studied in the past, but many of them simpli-
ﬁed VMs into a homogeneous commodity [3], [21]. With an
intention to address this problem, Zaman and Grou proposed
CA-GREEDY [4] and CA-LP [6], which are combinatorial
multi-unit auction mechanisms for VM allocation. However,
they still assumed that different types of VMs are interchange-
able up to a multiplicative factor, which does not faithfully
reﬂect real-world VM heterogeneity.
Bringing the heterogeneity nature of VMs into consider-
ation, Li et al. proposed double auctions for heterogeneous
virtual machine trading [18], [19]. Wang et al. formulated a
combinatorial auction for VM pricing, which is coupled with
an algorithm that is computationally efﬁcient [22]. These auc-
tions ingored the stage of resource provisioning, and implicitly
relied on static provisioning that is relatively inefﬁcient [1].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a cloud provider (CP) who periodically pools
its idle resources and leases them as virtual machines (VMs)
to cloud users (CUs), through round-by-round auctions. There
are t types of resources, such as CPU, RAM and network
bandwidth, in the CP’s resource pool. The total amount of
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type k resource is πk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ t. The CP offers m
different types of virtual machines VM1, . . . ,VMm. Based on
CUs’ demands submitted in their bids, the CP assembles its
resources into an appropriate number of VMs for each type j.
A VMj instance consumes an amount α
k
j of type k resource.
A set N of CUs act as bidders in the auction. Each CU
i ∈ N is free to bid for one or more bundles of VM instances.
For each bundle S = (r1, r2, . . . , rm), where rj is the number
of VMj instances CU i requests, let vi(S) be i’s valuation of
S. Let Bi be the set of all VM bundles CU i bids for. We
adopt an XOR bidding language, in which a CU can submit
multiple bids, but can win a single bid only (a CU’s bids are
mutually exclusive).
Each CU i has a quasi-linear utility deﬁned as:
ui =
{
vi(S)− pi if CU i wins a bundle S ∈ Bi
0 otherwise
where pi is the payment of CU i if it wins S. We assume that
the CUs are individually rational in that they always prefer
a higher utility; consequently vi(S) is the maximum amount
that CU i is willing to pay for S.
Let bi(S) denote the bid submitted by CU i for VM bundle
S. We denote by o the auctioneer (CP) and by uo =
∑
i∈N pi
the revenue of the auctioneer.
After collecting all bids submitted, the CP computes a
resource provision scheme, a VM instance allocation plan as
well as a corresponding payment vector. The winner determi-
nation problem can be formulated accordingly (WDP):
w(N ) = max
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
bi(S)xi(S) (1)
subject to:
m∑
j=1
njα
k
j ≤ πk ∀1 ≤ k ≤ t; (2)
∑
S∈Bi
xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N ; (3)
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
xi(S)rj ≤ nj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m,
S = (r1, r2, . . . , rm); (4)
nj ∈ N ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m; (5)
xi(S) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N , ∀S ∈ Bi. (6)
Here nj is the total number of VMj instances assembled,
and let n be the vector of nj values. Constraint (2) states that
the amount of resource of each type used for provisioning
can not exceed what is available in the resource pool. The
total number of VM instances of each type won by all CUs is
bounded by the number provisioned, as enforced in Constraint
(4). Constraint (3) implements the XOR bidding rule.
Theorem 1. Relaxing n to take fractional values in the WDP
does not change the value of w(N ).
Proof: Let WDP′ be the problem derived from WDP
with constraint (5) removed, and let w′(N ) be the objective
function of WDP′. w′(N ) ≥ w(N ) since WDP′ has fewer
constraints. Given a solution (n′, x′) to WDP′, we claim
that (n′, x′) is a solution to WDP, in which case we can
conclude that w′(N ) ≤ w(N ). In WDP, (n′, x′) satisﬁes
constraints (3, 5, 6).
∑m
j=1njα
k
j ≤
∑m
j=1 njα
k
j ≤ πk, hence
constraint (2) holds. Finally,
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
xi(S)rj ≤ nj
(constraint (4) is feasible) since
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
xi(S)rj ≤ nj
and x, r are integers. Hence the claim is true, and we have
w′(N ) = w(N ).
In light of Theorem 1, we can solve WDP in three steps:
relax WDP to WDP′, solve WDP′, then round each nj to
nj. Note that WDP′ is a linear integer program with a
moderate number of {0, 1}-variables, which are known to
be practically solvable in a reasonable amount of time. Our
empirical experiences show that even with up to 5, 000 {0, 1}-
variables (xi(S)), the WDP can still be solved in a second,
using CPLEX [13] on an off-the-shelf laptop computer. An
optimal solution to the WDP maximizes the social welfare of
the cloud market, and is required in any economically efﬁcient
auction. Notations are summarized in the table below.
N Set of CUs pi Payment of CU i
W Set of Winners ui Utility of CU i
αkj Amount of type k resource required by a VMj instance
bi(S) Bid price of CU i for bundle S
Bi Set of bundles of VMs bid by CU i
nj Number of VMj instances assembled
πk Total amount of type k resource in resource pool
Si Bundle of VMs allocated to CU i
vi(S) Valuation for bundle S of CU i
xi(S) Indicate whether CU i wins bundle S or not
IV. CORE-SELECTING VM AUCTIONS
A. The Core of Our VM Auction
Let Si denote the bundle of VMs allocated to CU i in the
auction, and Si = ∅ if i loses. An auction outcome is blocked
by coalition C ⊆ N if there is an alternative outcome with
awarded bundles {S ′i}i∈N and payment vector p
′, such that
u′i ≥ ui for all i ∈ C, and u
′
o =
∑
i∈N p
′
i > uo. C is referred
to as a blocking coalition. The outcomes not blocked by any
coalition with respect to the submitted bids b form the core:
Core(N ) =
{u ≥ 0|
∑
i∈N∪{o}
ui = w(N ),
∑
i∈C∪{o}
ui ≥ w(C),∀C ⊆ N} (7)
For example, consider seven CUs numbered 1 through 7,
each submitting a single bid for three types of VMs, with the
following conﬁguration in CPU units and storage (GB): (1, 1),
(1, 3) and (2, 1). The CP has 25 CPUs and 25 GB storage in
its resource pool, and the following bids are submitted. The
CPU and storage consumptions of each bid are given in the
superscript and subscript, respectively.
b1(6, 0, 1)
8
7 = 4 b2(2, 3, 0)
5
11 = 5 b3(0, 0, 6)
12
6 = 4
b4(7, 0, 0)
7
7 = 27 b5(0, 4, 0)
4
12 = 25 b6(0, 0, 6)
12
6 = 24
b7(5, 3, 7)
24
22 = 33
The unique set of winners in any efﬁcient allocation includes
CUs 4, 5 and 6, generating a social welfare of 76. The core
can be drawn in the payment space, shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. A geometric illustration of the core.
In this simple example, the constraints deﬁning the core are
simply the bids of the losing CUs together with individual
rationality of winning CUs. In particular, since CU 1 will
always block if CU 4 pays less than 4, we have the constraint
p4 ≥ 4. Similarly, CU 2 and CU 3 dictate p5 ≥ 5 and p6 ≥ 4,
respectively. CU 7 blocks if CUs 4, 5 and 6 pay less than
33 in total, implying p4 + p5 + p6 ≥ 33. Upper-bounds are
given by winners’ bids themselves, consistent with individual
rationality. As a result, the intersection of the half spaces
deﬁned above formulates the core.
In a general economic problem, the core does not always
exist [16]. However, the core is always non-empty in our
setting, and in particular contains the ﬁrst price payment (the
winner pays what he bids).
Theorem 2. The payment vector of ﬁrst price auction is
always in the core of our VM auction.
Proof: Let W ⊆ N be the set of winners. Note that
pFPi = bi(Si), ∀i ∈ W and u
FP
i = 0 no matter whether CU i
wins or not. We have the following:
(1)
∑
i∈N∪{o} u
FP
i = u
FP
o =
∑
i∈W p
FP
i =
∑
i∈W bi(Si) = w(N ).
(2)
∑
i∈C∪{o} u
FP
i = u
FP
o = w(N ) ≥ w(C), ∀C ⊆ N .
Hence by deﬁnition uFP ∈ Core(N ).
B. Necessity of Core-Selecting Auctions
How do we justify the use of a core-selecting auction in a
cloud market? We next take VCG revenue as a benchmark, and
prove that a core-selecting auction always generates a revenue
for the CP at least on par with the VCG revenue, even when
bidders are using shills. This is done by showing that a core-
selecting auction always leads to a total CU utility no higher
than that in the VCG auction, which is combined with the fact
that the total utility from both the CP and the CUs is constant
in an efﬁcient VM provisioning and allocation scheme.
Informally, the VCG mechanism ﬁrst solves the WDP to
obtain an optimal allocation, and asks each winning CU to
pay a price equal to the externality it exerts on the other CUs.
More speciﬁcally, the VCG payment of a winning CU i is:
pi = bi(Si)− (w(N )− w(N\{i})) (8)
where w(N )−w(N\{i}) is the marginal contribution of CU
i, i.e., the revenue difference with and without CU i bidding.
We now illustrate the shill bidding problem under the VCG
mechanism with the example from section IV-A. Assume that
instead of submitting its own bid, CU 5 impersonates four
different CUs, each submitting the bid b(0, 1, 0)1
3
= 6.25.
Knowing the rule of the VCG mechanism, CU 5 still wins
4 instances of VM2, while successfully reducing its payment
from 5 to 0 (because each shill wins one VM2 instance
and pays 0 under the VCG mechanism) via disaggregation
and impersonation, manifesting the shill bidding problem that
threatens the CP’s revenue.
Now we are ready to show that in our cloud market, core-
selecting auctions formulated with WDP as the winner deter-
mination problem are essentially robust against shill bidding.
Theorem 3. In a VM auction formulated with WDP, no CU
can earn more than its VCG utility by bidding with shills if
and only if the auction is core-selecting.
Proof: Given a set of CUs N and an auctioneer o, we
show that for any coalition C ⊆ N , their total utility in a
core-selecting auction is no more than if they were to act as a
single CU in a VCG auction, in which case the merged entity
would bid the same bundle of VMs at the aggregated price.
The merged entity of C enjoys a utility equal to its marginal
contribution: w(N ) − w(N\C). Our restriction is therefore∑
i∈C
ui ≤ w(N )− w(N\C) (9)
Since WDP guarantees efﬁciency, we have
w(N ) =
∑
i∈N∪{o}
ui (10)
In view of (10), (9) holds if and only if∑
i∈(N∪{o})\C
ui ≥ w(N\C) (11)
Since C is an arbitrary coalition of CUs, we have that for
every coalition D = N\C,
∑
i∈D∪{o} ui ≥ w(D), which
implies that there is no blocking coalition in the auction.
Together with efﬁciency, we derive u ∈ Core(N ).
Combining Teorem 3 with the deﬁnition of CU utility, we
have the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. Each CU’s in-core payment in a VM auction
formulated with WDP is at least as high as its VCG payment.
Corollary 2. The total revenue in a core-selecting VM auction
formulated with WDP is at least as high as that in a VCG
auction.
V. CORE-SELECTING PAYMENT RULES AND ALGORITHMS
We next study several payment rules that can be employed
in our core-selecting VM auction, and formulate a linear
program and a quadratic program for implementing these rules.
A. Revenue Minimization Rule
Individually rational CUs can try to maximize their utilities
through either unilateral or collusive strategic behaviors. In
Section IV-B we show that CUs gain no beneﬁts through a
form of collusion known as shill bidding. With the relaxation
of absolute truthfulness in core-selecting auctions, we are
further motivated to minimize CUs’ beneﬁts from unilaterally
155
deviating from truth-telling, which in turn, maximizes CUs’
incentives towards reporting valuations truthfully.
We start with the notion of bidder-Pareto optimality:
Deﬁnition A core-selecting auction is bidder-Pareto optimal
if it always generates a core outcome such that no other
core outcome can improve at least one CU’s utility without
reducing any other one’s in N .
To measure how much CUs are likely to deviate from
truthful reporting, we deﬁne the incentive proﬁle for a core-
selecting auction.
Deﬁnition The incentive proﬁle of a core-selecting auction
M at v is {θMi (v)}i∈N , where θ
M
i (v) is i’s maximum utility
gain by deviating from truthful reporting.
We aim at minimizing CUs’ overall economic beneﬁts from
deviating from truthful bidding in our core-selecting auction.
Consider a core-selecting auction M , it provides optimal
incentives if there is no core-selecting auction M ′ such that
θM
′
i (v) ≤ θ
M
i (v), i ∈ N with strict inequality for some i.
Actually, core-selecting auctionM provides optimal incentives
if and only if M is bidder-Pareto optimal [14].
Suppose that in our efﬁcient VM auction, CU i bids
truthfully and wins a bundle of VMs at price pi. By Corollary
1, pi is guaranteed to be at least p
VCG
i . The following lemma
bounds the economic beneﬁt of i [15], [23]:
Lemma 1. For any efﬁcient auction that produces payments
greater than or equal to the VCG payments, the amount that
bidder i can beneﬁt by unilaterally deviating from the truthful
bidding strategy is no more than pi − pVCGi .
Theorem 4. A core-selecting VM auction formulated with
WDP provides optimal incentives for truthful bidding if and
only if it is a bidder-Pareto optimal auction.
Proof: A VM auction formulated with WDP is efﬁcient.
From Lemma 1, for a bidder-Pareto optimal, core-selecting
VM auction formulated with WDP, the maximum beneﬁt CU
i can get is pi − p
VCG
i . Hence the auction is suboptimal
exactly when there is another core-selecting auction with
higher utilities for all CUs, contradicting the assumption that
this auction is bidder-Pareto optimal.
Nonetheless, there may be a broad range of possible bidder-
Pareto optimal outcomes in the core. By minimizing the
total payments over the core, one can guarantee bidder-Pareto
optimality [15], which narrows the space of possible outcomes
as well. We further derive the following corollary:
Corollary 3. A core-selecting VM auction formulated with
WDP and employing a revenue-minimization payment rule
minimizes CUs’ incentives to deviate from truthful bidding.
Recall the coalitional core constraint, we have∑
i∈C∪{o}
ui ≥ w(C), ∀C ⊆ N (12)
Assume that CU i receives a bundle Si. Let W be the set
of winning CUs in WDP, we expand (12) to obtain:
uo +
∑
i∈C∩W
ui +
∑
i∈C\W
ui =
∑
i∈W
pi +
∑
i∈C∩W
(bi(Si)− pi)
=
∑
i∈W\C
pi +
∑
i∈C∩W
bi(Si) ≥ w(C), ∀C ⊆ N (13)
Let C˜ = C ∩W, then we have w(C) ≤ w(C˜ ∪ (N\W)) since
C ⊆ C˜ ∪ (N\W). Since C is an arbitrary subset of N , (13) is
equivalent to∑
i∈W\C˜
pi ≥ w(C˜ ∪ (N\W))−
∑
i∈C˜
bi(Si), ∀C˜ ⊆ W (14)
Setting βC˜ = w(C˜ ∪ (N\W))−
∑
i∈C˜ bi(Si), and denoting the
vector of all βC˜ as β, we can reformulate (14) as
Ap ≥ β (15)
where A is a 2|W|−1 × |W| matrix. In each row aT
C˜
of A,
the i-th entry equals 0 if CU i is in coalition C˜ and equals 1
otherwise. The revenue minimization rule can be formulated
as the following linear program (LP):
δ = min 1T · p
subject to:
Ap ≥ β
p ≤ b
B. Point Reference Rules
The points minimizing the revenue are not unique, hence
there is a lack of precision even if we minimize the total
payments over the core to ensure bidder-Pareto-optimality. We
further deﬁne a point reference rule, for choosing among these
points the one that has the smallest geometric distance from
some pre-determined reference point p′.
The reference point can be static or dependent on CUs’
bids. The point reference rule always leads to a unique
revenue-minimizing payment vector, which can be computed
by solving the following quadratic program (QP):
min(p− p′)T (p− p′)
subject to:
Ap ≥ β
p ≤ b
1
T · p = δ
We introduce two speciﬁc point reference rules. The ﬁrst is
the VCG-nearest rule, in which p′ is set to be the VCG point
pVCG. This payment rule is natural in that pVCG is known to
be the payment point that motivates truthful bidding.
The second is the constant p′ reference rule. In this rule p′
is some constant payment point pre-deﬁned by the auctioneer.
Under this rule, the ﬁnal payment highly depends on the
assumptions of the auctioneer, and the winner with high
valuation relative to the auctioneer’s expectation shares less
of the burden to conquer a coalitional blocking.
We elaborate this with an example. Consider the origin-
nearest rule, in which p′ = 0. There are 18 CPUs and 18 GB
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storage in the resource pool. Four CUs each submits a single
bid for three types of VMs, with the following conﬁguration
in CPU units and storage (GB): (1, 1), (1, 3) and (2, 1):
b1(0, 0, 6)
12
6 = 100 b2(0, 4, 0)
4
12 = 20
b3(0, 4, 6)
16
18
= 60 b4(0, 0, 6)
12
6
= 50
The VCG payments (50, 0) for winners 1 and 2 are not in
the core; the pair must raise their combined payment to 60 to
keep CU 3 from blocking. If the origin-nearest rule is used,
CU 2 will be responsible for this total payment increase with
ﬁnal payments (50, 10). In comparison, the VCG-nearest rule
results in a sharing of this burden, with payments (55, 5).
Since the QP is a convex problem, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions are sufﬁcient and necessary for the QP. The
KKT conditions indicate that for an optimal solution p∗ to the
QP, there exist a vector λ ≥ 0, a vector ω ≥ 0, and a scalar
ν ≥ 0, such that
p
∗ − p′ − ATλ+ Iω + 1ν = 0 (16)
where I is the identity matrix of size |p|. The ﬁnal payment
p∗ can be decomposed as follows for each winning CU i:
p∗i = p
′
i +
∑
C˜∈W\{i}
λC˜ − ωi − ν
By utilizing the KKT conditions, it can be shown that the set
of constraints p ≤ b is not necessary under the VCG-nearest
rule, which simpliﬁes the QP and improves computational
efﬁciency.
Theorem 5. Under the VCG-nearest rule, the set of con-
straints p ≤ b in the QP is unnecessary.
Proof: By way of contradiction, assume that there is an
i ∈ W , such that the constraint pi ≤ bi(Si) is necessary. Then
there exists some  > 0, for which the constraint is still tight
when relaxed by , and for which the solution must change.
After relaxation, bi(Si) is increased by  and the set of winners
W due to WDP does not change. Now for the VCG-nearest
rule, the KKT necessary and sufﬁcient conditions form the
same linear system, since the only affected condition is that of
CU i, i.e., p∗i = p
VCG
i +
∑
C˜∈W\{i} λC˜−ωi−ν, which remains
unchanged when bi(Si) increases by . This is because p
VCG
i =
bi(Si)−w(N ) +w(N\{i}), and the increment  in bi(Si) is
cancelled by the increase  in w(N ). Now the solution to the
linear system does not change when the constraint is relaxed
by , which is a contradiction.
Based on Theorem 5, under the VCG-nearest rule, we can
solve the following quadratic program instead, which still
generates the optimal solution but is easier to solve.
min(p− pVCG)T (p− pVCG)
subject to:
Ap ≥ β
1
T · p = δ
C. Payment Generation Algorithm
In the payment rules mentioned above, evaluating each βC˜
requires the solution of a WDP, so there will be 2|W|−1
non-empty coalitions to consider, prohibitive for a large |W|.
However, by adapting the core-constraint generation process
given by Day and Raghavan [15], a VCG-nearest in-core
payment generation procedure can be employed to reduce the
complexity, as shown in Algorithm 1. Instead of enumerating
all the possibilities of non-empty coalitions, it ﬁnds blocking
coalitions effectively by raising payments from the reference
point, thereby reducing the complexity. Algorithm 1 can
further be easily adapted to solve the in-core payment vectors
under other payment rules. The following theorem shows that
Algorithm 1 always yields the VCG-nearest in-core payment.
Algorithm 1: VCG-Nearest In-Core Payment Generation
1 Set t := 0, payment vector pt := pVCG, coefﬁcient matrix
At := ∅, and vector βt := ∅;
2 while True do
3 t := t+ 1;
4 for CU i ∈ N do
5 for bundle S bid by i do
6 bti(S) := bi(S)− (bi(Si)− p
t−1
i );
7 end
8 end
9 Calculate wt(N ) with bt, and the set of winning CUs Ct
is the most violated coalition;
10 if wt(N ) ≤ 1Tpt−1 then break;
11 C˜t := Ct ∩W;
12 βC˜t := w
t(C˜t ∪ (N\W))−
∑
i∈C˜t b
t
i(Si);
13 Append the corresponding row aT
C˜t
and new entry βC˜t to
At−1 and βt−1 to form At and βt, respectively;
14 Solve the LP with At and βt, obtaining δt;
15 Solve the QP with At,βt and δt, obtaining pt;
16 end
17 p∗ := pt−1 is the ﬁnal payment vector.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 always yields VCG-nearest in-core
payments.
Proof: We claim that when the algorithm terminates, pt−1
is in the core. Suppose this is not true, then (14) does not hold:∑
i∈W\C˜
pt−1i < w(C˜ ∪ (N\W))−
∑
i∈C˜
bi(Si), ∃C˜ ⊆ W (17)
From Algorithm 1 (Line 6), we have{
bti(Si) = p
t−1
i , i ∈ W
bti(S) = bi(S), i /∈ W
(18)
Eq. (18) and the stopping criterion (Line 10) lead to:
wt(C˜ ∪ (N\W)) ≤ wt(N ) ≤
∑
i∈W\C˜
pt−1i +
∑
i∈C˜
bti(Si) (19)
We further have the following:∑
i∈C˜
(bi(Si)− b
t
i(Si)) <1 w(C˜ ∪ (N\W))− w
t(C˜ ∪ (N\W))
≤2
∑
i∈W˜
(bi(S˜i)− b
t
i(S˜i)) =3
∑
i∈W˜∩C˜
(bi(S˜i)− b
t
i(S˜i)) (20)
where W˜ is the set of winners to w(C˜∪(N\W)) with bundle
S˜i allocated to CU i. <1 is due to (17) and (19). Winning
set W˜ with bundle S˜i allocated to i is a feasible solution to
wt(C˜∪(N\W)), and hence
∑
i∈W˜ b
t
i(S˜i) ≤ w
t(C˜∪(N\W)),
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which leads to ≤2. =3 is due to Eq. (18) and the fact that
W˜ ⊆ C˜ ∪ (N\W). In view of Line 6, (20) indicates:∑
i∈C˜
(bi(Si)− p
t−1
i ) <
∑
i∈W˜∩C˜
(bi(Si)− p
t−1
i ) (21)
(21) does not hold and our claim is hence correct. The in-
core payment is VCG-nearest since the correlated LP and QP
are solved. The convergence of this algorithm is guaranteed
because only a ﬁnite number of blocking constraints may be
generated, and because the core always contains at least the
trivial ﬁrst-price payment solution (Theorem 2).
VI. SIMULATION STUDIES
A. Simulation Environment
We consider 7 types of VMs conﬁgured from 4 types of
resources (Table I). The default amount of resources in the
cloud is R = (5000, 14000, 16000, 700000), and scales from
0.5R to 4R in other cases. The number of bids submitted
by a CU is uniform on [1, 6]. The bundles of VMs that a CU
requests and the bid prices are generated according to uniform
and normal distributions, respectively; we refer to this setting
as “uniform-normal”. For each set of auction parameters, the
results shown are averaged over 100 simulation executions.
We adopt the following performance criteria. (a) Social
welfare, measured as the sum of reported values from all
the winning CUs. (b) Resource utilization, the percentage of
resources that are provisioned and sold. (c) User satisfaction,
the percentage of CUs winning a VM bundle. (d) CP revenue.
B. VCG-Nearest vs. Origin-Nearest Payment Rules
Using the example in Section V-B, we show that the use
of the origin-nearest rule (p′ = 0) can lead to a high-valued
winner shouldering little of the monetary burden, if any, to
conquer a blocking coalition. When the VCG payment is not
in the core, we deﬁne the monetary burden [16] of CU i¯ as:
μi¯ =
p∗i¯ − p
VCG
i¯∑
i∈N (p
∗
i − p
VCG
i )
(22)
where i¯ is the index of the highest-valued winning CU or the
lowest-valued winning CU.
Using this measure, Fig. 3 demonstrates that this phe-
nomenon is not peculiar to a carefully constructed example,
but indeed occurs frequently from random data sets. For
the VCG-nearest computations, the statistic (22) averages
∼27% for the highest-valued winner, while the origin-nearest
computations result in a value of ∼5% for the highest-valued
winner; the use of the origin-nearest rule results in high-
valued winners shouldering less of the burden of conquering
blocking coalitions. Similarly, the lowest-valued winners pay
∼29% of the burden under the VCG-nearest rule, while they
pay 42% under the origin-nearest implementation. From these
ﬁgures, this disparity between these two approaches is most
pronounced when the number of CUs is small.
C. Allocation Results
We use “xVyR” to denote the auction settings, where x
represents the number of types of VMs auctioned and y
represents that an amount yR of resources are available (R
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Fig. 3. The ﬁgures show the monetary burden shouldered by the winner(s)
under (a) the VCG-nearest rule, and (b) the origin-nearest rule.
is a vector deﬁned in Sec. VI-A). When x = 4, we are using
the VMs from Table I with odd IDs.
Fig. 4 plots the social welfare, resource utilization and
user satisfaction under core-selecting auctions, by changing
the number of CUs from 10 to 80. Both static and dynamic
resource provisioning are tested. When SRP is employed, the
resource provisioning scheme, i.e., the vector (n1, . . . , nm), is
determined by solving w(N ) for 100 times and multiplying
their average with some value such that at least one type
of resource is depleted. This way we try to improve the
performance of SRP through predicting the market demand,
for comparison with DRP.
In Fig. 4a, the relative social welfare is at least 10% larger
under DRP than under SRP. An interesting observation is that
‘4V1R static’ is always higher than ‘7V1R static’, under an
equal amount of resources. This is because in the former
scenario, the 4 types of VMs on sale are ﬁner-grained in their
conﬁgurations, so that a larger number of VM instances can
be constructed for sale, leading to a higher social welfare.
Fig. 4b shows that when our 3-D auction mechanism is
employed, with resources dynamically provisioned, resource
utilization does not apparently change, and is as high as 90%
in ‘7V2R dynamic’. In contrast, under static provisioning,
resource utilization increases with the number of CUs, and
is always lower than that under DRP. Despite the fact that we
already attempted to improve the performance of SRP, the gap
is still as high as 21%.
An interesting phenomenon in Fig. 4c is that user satis-
faction decreases and remains rather low when the number of
CUs is large. This is due to the fact that when there are enough
participants in the auction, there exist a few CUs requesting
large bundles of VMs and submitting high bids to exclude
other CUs. We can see that SRP performs better than DRP in
terms of user satisfaction.
D. The Role of Bid Distribution
To investigate the inﬂuence on revenues by the bid distribu-
tion, in addition to “uniform-normal”, we further adopt another
three settings for comparison, which are “uniform-uniform”,
“normal-normal” and “normal-uniform”. From Fig. 5a and Fig.
5b, we ﬁnd that the performance of core-selecting auctions is
rather stable. Even when bidding instances are generated in
different ways, the revenues do not deteriorate.
In Fig. 5c, CUs’ bids are synthesized from Google Cluster
Data [17] with bid prices generated according to normal
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Fig. 4. Performance of the VM allocation result under core-selecting auctions.
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Fig. 5. Inﬂuence of bid distribution.
distribution. We ﬁnd that revenues increase moderately with
the number of CUs and increase approximately linearly with
increasing amount of resources, which is consistent with what
we observe in Fig. 5a and in Fig. 5b.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Core-selecting auctions are emerging as an effective com-
binatorial auction mechanism for allocating bundles of goods.
They guarantee economic efﬁciency, are proof to shill bidding,
and outperform VCG auctions in revenue. This work is the ﬁrst
that designs core-selecting auctions for the cloud computing
market, and advances the state-of-the-art of VM auction de-
sign by generalizing static resource provisioning to dynamic
resource provisioning, and from homogeneous VM instances
to heterogeneous VM instances.
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